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I believe that American biotechnology can help others. But it can't be if the
product of that is taken away or if the incentive to innovate and the incentive to
profit by your research is removed.'
And if the United States has to be the only nation to stand against the biodiversity
treaty as now drawn, so be it.2
George Bush
President of the United States of America, 1989 - 1993
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED),
commonly referred to as the "Earth Summit," was held June 3-14, 1992, in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil.3 The Convention4 on Biological Diversity5 was one of the treaties opened for
signature by the represented nations. Finally adopted after years of deliberation, the
Convention was designed to help preserve the biological diversity of the planet, encourage
the sustainable use of its ecological components, and encourage the fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits which arise out of the utilization of genetic resources.' Among other
Convention provisions, there are mandates requiring the signatory nations to provide for
appropriate access to their genetic and biological resources, to provide for the distribution
of resulting benefits, and to assist in the transfer of relevant technologies to developing
nations.
The United States of America, the only major member of the United Nations refusing
to sign the Convention,' objected to the provisions of the Convention relating to technology
1. The President's News Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1043,
1049 (June 13, 1992).
2. Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters Prior to a Meeting with Congressional Leaders, 28 WEEKLY
COMP. PaS. Doc. 1035, 1036 (June 11, 1992).
3. See, e.g., Thomas L. Adams, Jr., & Jose Martinez-Aragon, Setting the Stage for the Earth Summit:
Brazil 1992, 22 ENVL L RE'. 10190, (1992) (discussing the entire Conference generally). See generally
Marianne Lavelle, The Earth Summit: Building a Body of Environmental Law, NAT'L LJ., June 1, 1992, at 1
(discussing possible legal implication of actions to be taken at the Conference).
4. 'An internalional agreement; a pact or agreement between states or nations in the nature of a treaty;
usually applied [to] ... international agreements for the regulation of matters of common interest but not coming
within the sphere of polities or commercial intercourse." BLAcK's LAw DIcrioNARY 331 (6th ed. 1990).
5. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Convention on Biological Diversity,
opened for signature, June 5, 1992, 31 LL.M. 818 [hereinafter Convention].
6. Id. at 823. See also Earth Summit Approves Agenda 21, Rio Declaration Record Number of World
Leaders Attend, U.N. CRmoN., Sept. 1992, at 59. See also generally Katheryn Rackleff, Note, Preservation of
Biological Diversity: Toward a Global Convention, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L. L. & PoLY 405 (1992)
(discussing the concerts and objectives of preserving global biological diversity in the context of creating the
draft version of the Convention).
7. Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
8. Edith B. Weiss, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 814, 817
(1992) (introductory note to the I.L.M. publication of UNCED conference documents); Industry Trade Groups
Laud President Bush fir Decision Not to Sign Biodiversity Treaty, PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPYRiHT L. DAiLY
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transfer and intellectual property rights, as well as provisions concerning biotechnology,
biosafety, and funding.9 Despite the U.S. view of the Convention,"0 as of June 29, 1992,
157 member states of the United Nations were signatories."
As with many other industries and emerging scientific fields, the historical practice with
biotechnology-based industries" has been to invest heavily in highly speculative research
and world-wide exploration.' 3 Many companies involved with biotechnology have focused
on exploring and exploiting the species-rich tropical areas of the developing world. 4 The
more numerous and diverse the species of flora and fauna, the better the chances of finding
a new or unique lifeform, chemical compound, or improved seeds and food sources for new
and profitable products."5
(BNA), June 15, 1992 (availible in WESTLAW, BNA-PTD database).
9. Weiss, supra note 8, at 817. See United States: Declaration Made at the United Nations
Environmental Programme Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 848 (1992) (reproduction of the statement entered by the U.S. at the conference for the
adoption of the text of the Convention discussing the objections to the Convention) [hereinafter Declaration].
See generally Remarks on Departure for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 28
WEEKLY CoMe. PREs. Doc. 1034, 1036 (June 11, 1992) (text of Presidential speech delivered before President
Bush left for the Conference, and discussing his refusal to sign the Convention on Biological Diversity); see
generally Question-and-Answer Session with Employees of Evergreen Oil in Newark, California, 28 WEEKLY
COMIP. PREs. Doc. 1090, 1093 (June 18, 1992) (Remarks by President Bush in answer to a question concerning
the Conference and balancing growth with long-term environmental needs, the President responding with his
explanation for refusing to sign the Convention).
10. See Weiss, supra note 8 at 817. The U.S. officially objected to the draft form of the Convention in
a written declaration at the signing of the Nairobi Final Act (the final version of the draft). Declaration, supra
note 9, at 848. The U.S. refused to sign the current final version of the Convention in Rio de Janeiro, at the
United Nation Conference on Environment and Development. Id
11. Convention, supra note 5, at 818, n.*. If 30 or more signatory nations ratify the Convention, it will
then become binding on those nations. Id art. 36, at para. 3; William K. Stevens, Striving for Balance, N.Y.
TMMs, May 24, 1992, § I, at 8. But see Reginald Rhein, Patent Attorneys See No Immediate Threat in Rio
Treaty, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Jun. 15, 1992, at I (discussing that many patent lawyers believe the
Convention will fail to be ratified).
12. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CoNGREsS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
3 (1991). Biotechnology has been developed over the past few decades, especially by universities, laboratories,
and industry in the U.S.. Id Biotechnology is not usually defined as an industry itself, but has been defined as
a scientific field or set of laboratory research methods and techniques involving biological and genetic resources.
Id Biotechnology can be referred to as an industry, especially due to the growing emergence of dedicated
biotechnology companies. See Id at 3-7. See generally STEPHEN C. Wrrr, CAL. AG. LANDS PRo ECr
BRiEFBooK: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC DvEsrrY (1985). See infra note 120 (presenting the definition of
biotechnology as used in the Convention).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 104-11 (discussing the historical and present practices of the
biotechnology-based industries).
14. See WRIT, supra note 12, at 13-19 (discussing the international economic potential of biological
resources related to biotechnology). For example, of the estimated 240,000 species of plants on this planet, two-
thirds are geographically in the typically less tropics. Id. at 17. See generally infra text accompanying notes 204-
17 (describing the specific activities of U.S. biotechnology companies in the developing world). See also
generally Kirstin Peterson, Note, "Recent Developments,"Recent Intellectual Property Trends in Developing
Countries, 33 HARV. INT'L L. 1. 277 (1992) (discussing that growth in the awareness of the economic potential
of the rain forest has fueled increased in research activities in the developing countries).
15. See Rackleff, supra note 6, at 408-13 (discussing the general importance of biological diversity in
the framework of the tropical rain forest). See generally Wrrr, supra note 12 (discussing the importance of
genetic diversity and the impact of biotechnology in the food, agricultural, and plant breeding fields). See infra
text accompanying notes 179-84 (discussing the importance, results and general background of biotechnology).
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The biotechnology products resulting from this research have been protected by the
intellectual property rights system, usually in the form of patent protection.16 These forms
of property rights are justified as the recognition of an exclusive right in the product of labor
or creativity.'7 Intellectual property rights are designed to provide incentives for invention
and to secure profits for the just compensation of research and development, and therefore
to promote further research or discovery.' 8
Biotechnology-based firms and industry trade groups in the U.S. lobbied the U.S.
administration to reject the Convention. 9 Their primary concern was the potential loss of
protection for intellectual property rights in theseU.S.-dominated industries." Specifically,
these lobbyists take the position that the provisions in the Convention requiring access to and
transfer of technologies developed from biotechnology research will cause U.S.
biotechnology firms to lose substantial incentives to invent and undertake expensive and
speculative research projects, resulting in the loss of U.S. jobs, money, and industry
dominance.2 1
The Convention provisions disputed by the U.S. specify the relevant technologies to be
affected as those based on genetic resources appropriated from the developing nations or
16. See infra text accompanying notes 90-103 (discussing the need for and purpose of patent protection
in the context of the U.S. biotechnology-based industries).
17. A discussion. of the philosophical and/or economic justifications for ownership of something that can
be described as property is beyond the scope of this comment. See OwNINa SciENIFIC AND TECHNICAL
INFORMATION, VALuE AND ETmcAL IssuEs (Vivian Weil & John W. Snapper eds. 1989), for an in-depth
analysis of the foundations of the U.S. intellectual property system, in the context of high-technology.
18. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, General Overview of the Intellectual Property System, in OwNINo ScIENTImc
AND TECHNICAL INFORMATnON, supra note 17, at 19-20 (discussing briefly the theories used to justify the
exclusive ownership of property concept conferred by the awarding of intellectual property rights). See text
accompanying notes 44-52 (discussing the general necessity of intellectual property rights in modem industry).
19. See, e.g., Industry Trade Groups Laud President Bush for Decision Not to Sign Biodiversity Treaty,
supra note 8; PTO, Bioiech Group explain Objections to Earth Summit's Biodiversity Treaty, PAT. TRADEMARK
& CoPYRIGrHT L. DAILY (BNA), June 11, 1992 (availible in WEsTLAW, BNA-PTD database); Rhein, supra note
11, at 1.
20. See, e.g., Declaration, supra note 9; Keith Schneider, U.S. to Reject Pact on Protection of Wildlife
and Global Resources, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1992, I1 (describing the U.S. State Dept. as saying the text of the
Convention did not give adequate protection to the patents of U.S. companies involved with transferring
biological invention technology); On Biodiversity... Survival Over Patent Rights, L.A. DAILY J., June 10, 1992
at 6 (quoting from the ARAB NEws, Saudi Arabia, stating the reason the U.S. failed to sign was the economic
effect of the loss in rights and patents).
21. UNCED - Technology Transfers for Poor Countries Would Kill Innovation, Du Pont Says, INT'L
ENvn.. DAILY (BNA), Apr. 22, 1992 (availible in WESTLAW, BNA-IED database) (discussing a Du Pont
corporate spokesman's statement that the free or cheap access and transfer of technology envisioned by the
draft version of the Convention will eventually lead to stifling innovation). See infra text accompanying notes
90-103 (discussing the need for and purpose of patent protection in the context of the U.S. biotechnology-based
industries). But see U.S. Rio Stance Said to Hurt Competitiveness, NAT'L L. J., June 22, 1992, at 5 (discussing
that the failure to participate in the Convention may actually hurt firms more than any potential loss in
intellectual property rights); Rhein, supra note 11, at I (discussing that although many biotechnology industry
groups oppose the Convention, many patent lawyers believe the Convention will fail to be ratified as other
similar international treaties have failed). See infra text accompanying notes 199-203 (discussing that the U.S.
biotechnology-based industries may be subject to the effects of the Convention regardless of whether the U.S.
becomes a signatory).
1992/ U.S. Biotech Intell. Prop. Rights: An Obstacle to UNCED?
those relevant to preserving biological diversity. 2 As the cost, availability, and usefulness
of biotechnology is affected by changes in the legal and economic status of genetic and other
biological resources, a primary concern will be the effect of the Convention on the U.S.
biotechnology-based industries, mostly the research-based pharmaceutical, chemical,
medicinal, food, and agricultural technology industries.'
This Comment focuses on the justifications for the U.S. objections to the provisions
concerning biotechnology and intellectual property rights, which resulted in the U.S. refusing
to become a signatory.2 Part II of this Comment presents the aspects of the biotechnology-
based industries relevant to an analysis of intellectual property rights and biological diversity
issues.25 Part III presents the background of issues relevant to the Convention itself,
including definitions and the actual disputed provisions. 26 Part IV presents and evaluates
the U.S. specific objections to the Convention in light of the present domestic and
international status of intellectual property rights.27 Part V discusses the effects of the
Conventionuponbiotechnology-based industries andpredicts the effects of the U.S. official
stance in light of relevant domestic and international circumstances.28 Part VI concludes
the analysis and summarizes the issues presented in this Comment.
Practitioners whose clients hold biotechnology-based intellectual property rights will
find this Comment useful in predicting future impositions of costs or other compensation that
22. See Convention, supra note 5, art. 15, 16, & 19. Three of the Convention's provisions clearly present
the relationship between the sought-after technology of the benefitted nation, and the loss of intellectual property
rights or other compensation for the originating nation:
Article 15. Access to Genetic Resources
3. For the purpose of this Convention, the genetic resources being provided by a Contracting Party
... are only those that are provided by ... countries of origin of such resources ....
7. Each Contracting Party shall take [action] ... with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way
the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other
utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources ....
Id art. 15, paras. 3, 7.
Article 16. Access to and Transfer of Technology
1. Each Contracting Party ... undertakes ... to provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer..
. of technologies that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or
make use of genetic resources ....
Id. art. 16, para. 1.
Article 19. Handling of Biotechnology and Distribution of its Benefits
2. Each Contracting Party shall take all practical measures to promote and advance priority access
... by Contracting parties ... to the results and benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon
genetic resources provided by those Contracting Parties ....
Id. art. 19, para. 2.
23. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text (discussing the anticipated effects of the Convention
upon the biotechnology-based industries).
24. An analysis of the other U.S. objections to the present form of the Convention, those provisions
concerning biosafety and financial mechanisms, is beyond the scope of this comment. Analysis of the possible
implications of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is beyond the scope of this paper.
25. See infra notes 29-103 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 104-50 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 151-84 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 185-217 and accompanying text.
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clients may owe to the originating nation of the product's genetic or biological resources.
As this Comment proposes, such concerns are legitimate despite the U.S. refusal to sign the
Convention.
H. RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY-BASED
INDUSTRIES
The preamble to the Convention states that the signatory nations "[a] cknowledg [el that
substantial investments are required to conserve biological diversity and that there is the
expectation of a broad range of environmental, economic and social benefits from those
investments."29 This contemplates more than society's substantial interest in the benefits
of preserving life on this planet; it recognizes the substantial expectation of benefits from
exploiting the protected biological diversity." As a result, biotechnology presents most
industries with a whole new field of exploration and research."
Research using biological or genetic resources is a significant undertaking. Most forms
of biotechnology research are highly expensive. 2 In addition, especially for the
pharmaceutical and medicinal industries, the amount of regulations and the required time-
consuming testing programs significantly add to the overall costs of basic biotechnology
research.33 Constant research and development programs, necessary to continue to meet
the competition and the expanding state-of-the-art, also contribute to the exceptional
emphasis on money. 4 The speculative nature of many biotechnology-based products
further raises the costs of biotechnology research.35
29. Convention, supra note 5, pmbl.
30. Peterson, .upra note 14, at 286 (discussing that the Convention is being promoted by many
developing nations because it allows an opportunity to generate revenue by marketing their biological resources).
31. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 3 (stating that biotechnology has revolutionized scientific research and is developing
products that might dranatically improve health, food supply, and the quality of the environment); OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTCHNOLOGY: U.S. INVESTIENT IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY 27 (1988) (discussing biotechnology and the U.S. intense interest in promoting research and
development).
32. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for Improved Patent
Protection Worldwide, 2 J. L. & TECH. 307 (1987) (available in WESTLAW, JLTECH database). For example,
in the pharmaceutical industry, because of technological and regulatory restraints, it is on average a process of
ten years and $125 million dollars to develop a new drug for the U.S. market. I
33. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONORESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 93. This notion is reflected in an exception to the patent laws, which extends the
duration of patent protection to cover the years lost during the required testing programs mandated by the F.D.A.
(Federal Food and Drug Administration, the agency responsible for approval of all medical drugs sold in the
U.S.). Ik
34. Id. at 49. This type of activity is intensely expensive; many biotechnology firmns spend over half their
expenses on just research and development. Id. In the pharmaceutical field, the research and development
expenditure amount is even greater. See id. at 81-82.
35. Id. at 81-83. Peterson, supra note 14, at 278.
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Consequently, the development of biotechnology has been primarily associated with the
large research universities in the United States.3 6 Such institutions provide a sizable
population of highly qualified research personnel and state-of-the-art technology and
equipment. The primary attraction for these universities is, however, money.37 Profiting
from an industrial sponsor or from an assigned patent35 allows the university to obtain
better equipment, better technology, and better personnel.3 9 Additionally, large research
institutions receive government grants to further basic science, thus lowering their access
costs for industry by externalizing many of their otherwise internal expenses.40
The university connection to biotechnology is a basic building block for the U.S.
biotechnology-based industries.41 Through the combination of universities, governmental
investment, and intellectual property laws, the U.S. has become the world leader in
biotechnology. 2 As such, expectations of increased growth and heightened demand have
stirred the biotechnology fields.
4 3
A. General Necessity of Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property rights are designed to reward creativity and to promote the arts and
sciences. This is accomplished by granting the holder an exclusive right to the new or
36. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY,
supra note 12, at 165. "University-based research was the foundation of U.S. leadership in initial commercial
applications of biotechnology." Id. See generally id at 24-25, 165-168 (discussing the current priorities and
activities in U.S. university, government, and industry research activities relating to biotechnology); OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: U.S. INVESTMENT IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 31, at 113-25 (discussing the fiscal and other relationships between research
universities in the U.S. and modem biotechnology research and development).
37. See Leonard G. Boonin, The University, Scientific Research, and the Ownership of Knowledge, in
OWNING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, VALUE AND ETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 17, at 253-67. See
also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: U.S.
INVESTMENr IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 31, at 118 (discussing the benefits to universities and industry from
such relationships and collaborations).
38. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 31, at 118. For instance, Stanford University receives $1.7
million annually from just one assigned patent, #4,237,224. Id at 102. This patent covers certain methods for
inserting foreign genes into a host microorganism for the purposes of reproducing and expressing such genes.
Id.
39. See id at 118-19 (discussing the general characteristics of the corporate/university connection).
40. TE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY
6-8 (1991). The federal government spent $3.5 billion in Fiscal Year 1990 for biotechnology-related research,
the majority support basic research in U.S. universities. Id
41. For an in-depth discussion of the problems and dangers of such a close industry-university
relationship, see Boonin, supra note 37, at 253-67.
42. Industry Trade Groups Laud President Bush for Decision Not to Sign Biodiversity Treaty, supra note
8. Biotechnology-based industries present a situation "where the United States is still clearly a leader globally."
Id. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra
note 12, at 19; THE PRESIDENTS COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
POLICY, supra note 40, at 4-5; CoUNCIL- ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL REPORT 350 (1992).
43. Dan Quayle, Vice-President, Memorandum for the President, in THtE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON
COMPETrIvENESs, REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POUICY, supra note 40, at la. The U.S.
biotechnology-based industries are expected to be a $50 billion concern by the year 2000. Id
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unique product, design, or technology."4 By securing the inventor or discoverer this
exclusive right for alimited amount of time, therewards of exclusive profits and control will
encourage more invention and creativity.!
Intellectual property rights are therefore issued by the government as a balance between
the inventor's private interests and the basic right of the public to embark in unrestricted
commerce. 46 The effect on the inventor is to enjoy the rewards of his work or
investment.47 Thus, an inventor will have the ability to control the access to or sale of his
invention by way of prohibiting the making, using, or selling of the invention by someone
who does not own the intellectual property right.48 Without intellectual property rights, an
entity with the appropriate finances and infrastructure could feasibly copy the product of one
inventor's time and money-intensive labor and sell an identical product-a product already
developed, tested, and marketed so as to be without risk.4 9 Since, the inventor's expected
profit would then go to the competitor, there is unjust enrichment.5" This form of free-
riding discourages the investment of resources which traditionally served as the impetus for
creating of better products for the public.
51
Intellectual property rights remove this unfair competition, and thereby promote
investment in research, and the development of new products. The net effect on society is
supposed to be the furthering of the general state-of-the-art or the promotion of a scientific
field. A system thal rewards those who exercise originality is thus benefits to society at
large.52
44. "The Congrems shall have the power... to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited tines to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." U.S. CoNsr. art 1, § 8 (emphasis added).
45. Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 19. Although there is a public benefit to lower prices from free
competition, an "inventor will make fewer (if any) sales, he will not be able to recoup his costs, and he will lack
the financial incentive to continue to innovate." IL
46. Boonin, supn note 37, at 257-58.
47. James L. Young & Paul S. Grunzweig, Obtaining a Patent, in OvERVIEW OF INTELLEcWrAL
PROPERTY FOR BuslNEss LAWYERS 1992 1 (Kinney & Lange, p.a. 1992).
48. Id. at 2.
49. This concept is noticed in the basic principles of the patent laws of the U.S., Title 35 of the U.S.
Code. The investor must meet 35 U.S.C. § 112, by sufficiently disclosing the invention "in the patent document
so that a person skilled in the applicable art can build and use the invention." Id. at 2.
50. See Nickolas E. Westman et at., International Protection of Intellectual Property, in OvER ViEW OF
INTELIEcTuAL PROPERTY FOR BusINEsS LAWYERS 1992, supra note 47, at 125-39 (discussing piracy and other
global neglect of intellectual property rights). For instance, the inadequate protection of U.S. intellectual property
rights in the internationtl marketplace has cost patent holders in the U.S. billions of dollars. Id. at 125. See
generally R Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards, Introduction, To INTELLECTuAL PROPERTY RIOHTs,
GLOBAL CONsENsus, GLOBAL CoNFucr7 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds.), Westview Press
,(1988) (discussing some of the primary theories behind the granting of intellectual property rights).
51. Aurthur Kuflik, Moral Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, in OWNING ScIMETMC AND
TECHNICAL INFORMATION, VALUE AND ETmcAL IssuEs, supra note 17, at 231-32. Not only is this free riding
on the work of others "inherently unfair," it "weakens the incentive to engage in innovative research and
development in the ftst place." I&
52. Young & Gnmzweig, supra note 47, at 1.
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B. Forms of Protection Available in the United States
The expectation and amount of protection afforded by the intellectual property system
depends upon the form of property. Patents are the basic, and historically the frst and most
important form of intellectual property protection 3 In the U.S., inventions that are shown
to be new and useful' are eligible to receive patent protection5 5 There are three types of
patents available under U.S. law: utility patents, 6 design patents,5 7 and plant patents.58
Utility patents are the most practical and desirable for most inventors, since these patents
cover mechanical, electrical, and chemical inventions.59 Both the process of manufacturing
a product and the invented product or object itself can be protected.' Design patents cover
the ornamental appearance of manufactured objects.61 Plant patents cover the exclusivity
of living plants that asexually reproduce.62
Title to the patent is vested in the inventor upon creation, 3 although in most other
countries, title is vested in the first person to obtain a patent." The patent is also chattel
and can be dealt with just as any other form of personal property. s The limited duration
of patent protection, 17 years, also represents the balance struck between the necessity to
promote the common good and the rights deemed inherent to the inventor."s
There are alternatives to the common intellectual property protection schemes for certain
inventions and products that have proven not to be suitable for the standard form of patent
or copyright protection.67 In the U.S., integrated circuits are protected by special
Congressional legislation,68 which protects the exclusive rights of circuit designers but
allows for increased access to those protected works in orderto promote research and further
the scientific field.69 The notion of special protection for a new field of technology that
allows for greater access and use of a protected piece of property has great implications for
53. Id.
54. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (discussing what constitutes the statutory concept of novelty).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
56. Young & Grunzweig, supra note 47, at 3. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (utility is inferred from the
term "useful," which is part of the statutory definition of a § 101 patent).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1988).




63. Young & Grunzweig, supra note 47, at 13.
64. John M. Richardson, United States: A Special Report by John. M. Richardson of Pennie & Edmons,
New York, INT'L FIN. L. Ray., Special Supplement, April 26, 1991, at 91. The system in the U.S. is known as
a first-to-invent protection scheme, while most other countries have developed patent systems that protect the
first-to-file. Id
65. An article of personal property, as distinguished from real property. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 236
(6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLACK's].
66. Boonin, supra note 37, at 257-58.
67. Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 28-29.
68. Public Law No. 98-620, 98th Congress, 2nd session, 8 November 1984, 98 Stat. 3347, Title I
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.), The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984.
69. Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 29.
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biotechnology industries.71 There are suggestions that the existing intellectual property
system is incapable of fully providing for all the interested parties in the biotechnology-based
industries.7 1 Access to and transferring of biotechnology and any derived benefits by way
of Congressional legislation, similar to the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act,72 might be
considered by those who are unhappy with the current level of protection afforded to
biotechnology by the Convention.73
Additionally, thePlant Variety Protection Act (PVPA)74 provides protection for certain
new plant species that reproduce sexually.7" Although the PVPA does not technically
create a patent, it does offer intellectual property protection similar to what the plant patent
offers for asexually reproduced plants.76 However, the PVPA includes exemptions to the
property owner's rigats for farmers and for research, thus allowing for access to and use of
the protected work (the plant) while still providing exclusive protection for the property
owner.77 In addition to the plant patent, and the PVPA, inventors were recently allowed to
apply for utility patents for plants.78
70. This type of legislative action granting special protection is based upon the doctrine of sui generis.
Pamela Samuelson, Innovation and Competition: Conflicts over Intellectual Property Rights in New
Technologies, in OwNINa ScmNTc AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, VALUE AND ETHICAL ISSUES, supra note
17, at 178. Sui generis is defined as "[o]f its own kind or class; Le., the only one of its own kind; peculiar."
BLAcK'S supra note 65, at 1434.
71. Yusing Ko, Cmment, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 YALE W. 777
(1992) (an economic analysis of the amount of protection given to biotechnological inventions by the U.S. court
system and whether traditional patent law should apply to such inventions). See THE PREsmENr's COUNCIL ON
COMPEITrpfmESs, REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTECHNoLOOY PoLIcY, supra note 40, at 18 (stating that
uncertainties in the. state of patent protection are hurting the development of the biotechnology-based industries,
specifically concerns with proposed legislation in the sphere of patenting chemical processes); GROUPS'
REPORTS, ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL POUR LA PROTECTION DE LA PRoPRmm INDusTRmiLLE (APPI)
ANuAImE 1991, XXXVTII CONGRESS, TOKYO 1992 (report on Question Number 93, biotechnology and the
relationship between patent protection and biotechnological inventions), reviewed by Arnold Vahrenwald, Book
Review, 14 EUR. INTE.. PROP. REV. 459,459 (1992) (discussing the AIPPr's statement that the general patent
system does not appear appropriate for inventions concerning living matter); Nigel Jones, Biotechnological
Parents in Europe - Update on the Draft Directive, 14 EUR. INTELL PROP. REV. 455, 457 (1992) (discussing
that from an European viewpoint, progress in biotechnology has continued to outrace legal measures regulating
the biotechnology-based industries, and that uncertainties exist as to ability to patent biotechnological products).
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (presenting the Software Chip Protection Act).
73. Genetically engineered lifeforms, a major emphasis of biotechnology, also present interesting
challenges to the intellectual property system. See Samuelson, supra note 70, at 178. See infra note 89
(discussing the potential applicability of the copyright laws to protecting the exclusivity in genetically engineered
lifeforms).
74. Pub. L. No. 91-577, Title I1, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified in 7 U.S.C. ch. 57 and 28 U.S.C.), amended
by Pub. L. No. 96-574, 94 Stat. 3350 (codified in 7 U.S.C. ch. 57) (1980), The Plant Variety Protection Act.
75. Frederick H. Buttel & Jill Belsky, Biotechnology, Plant Breeding, and Intellectual Property: Social
and Ethical Dimensions, in OwmNG SCemTIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, VALUE AND ETHICAL ISSUES,
supra note 17, at 121.
76. Id. See also text accompanying notes 53-66 (discussing the U.S. patent laws, in particular the plant
patent).
77. Buttel & Belsky, supra note 75, at 122. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONONESS,
BIOTECHNOLOoY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 205 (discussing the PVPA and two exemptions to
the property owner's resulting exclusive rights).
78. Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S. PAT. Q. 443 (PTO Bd. App. & Int. 1985) (a decision by the PTO Board
of Appeals granting patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 to genetically-altered plant tissues even though such
items could be protected under the PVPA).
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Furthermore, there is also a class of medicines and pharmaceuticals which can qualify
for a limited type of protection and limited duration of exclusive protection under the Orphan
Drug Act.79 This legislation is designed to provide incentives for companies to develop
new drugs for rare diseases and conditions where the number of persons affected with such
a disease or condition is not sufficient to support a competitive market or to undertake the
expense of securing intellectual property rights.0 Without such protection, there is usually
not enough incentive for a company to pursue this severely limited market."
Tort principles also provide protection for intellectual property rights. Trade secret
legislation provides a cause of action for the unfair acquisition of items and ideas that may
not meet the requirements of the patent, trademark, or copyright statutes.8 2 Thus, objects,
things, or ideas that cannot fit under the protection of the other forms of intellectual property
rights may be protected as trade secrets.83 There is also no limitation on the duration of
protection under the trade secret legislation, since this form of intellectual property rights is
available for as long as the holder remains silent.8"
Trade secrets are very different from patent protection. Once the proprietary
information, idea, expression, or method becomes generally known, or easily ascertainable
by proper means, it is no longer a secret and cannot be afforded protection.85 Thus, a major
drawback of protection by trade secrets is that if another entity independently develops the
identical product, idea, or method, then that product can be sold in competition without
restriction.8 6 Trade secrets are not advisable for biotechnology protection. 7
Trademark and copyrights are the other major forms of intellectual property rights,88
although they are not generally applicable to biotechnology. 9 As implied from the
foregoing discussion, patent protection is necessarily the principal form of intellectual
79. Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified in 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee), as amended.
80. Michael Davis, Patents, Natural Rights, and Natural Property, in OWNING ScIENr c AND
TECHNICAL INFORMATION, VALUE AND EThICAL IssuEs, supra note 17, at 245.
81. Id, at 245-46.
82. Joseph R. Kelly, Trade Secrets, in OVERVIEW OF INTEI.LECTUAL PROPERTY FOR BusNEss LAWYERs
1992, supra note 47, at 102.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 102-03.
86. Id. at 106 (citing the Commissioner's Comments to § 1 of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
87. OFFIcE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEW DEvELOPMENTs IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
U.S. INvEsTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 31, at 103 & n.22 (citing Prof. Merges of the Columbia
University School of Law as stating patents are more desirable than trade secret protection to dedicated
biotechnology companies).
88. Trademark laws are a product of consumerism, and the policy is protecting the consumer from
marketplace confusion. Wayne A. Siverston & N. Paul Freiderichs, Trademark Law, in OVERVIEW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR BusINEss LAWYERS 1992, supra note 47, at 43. Trademark laws can be thought
of as protecting the property interest in a brand name or identifying mark, so as to prevent unfair competition.
Id. Copyright laws, on the other hand, give authors the exclusive right to reproduce, prepare derivatives,
distribute reproductions, perform, and display their works of art or other forms of expression. Thomas J. Stueber
& Paul Grunzweig, Copyright Law, in OVERVIEW OF INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY FOR BusINEss LAWYERS 1992,
supra note 47, at 17-24. Similar to any intellectual property system, both promote societal interests and progress
even though restricting free commerce.
89. It has been suggested that like software code, the biotechnologically altered genetic code in a cell
should be copyrightable. A. I. Lemin, Patenting Microorganisms: Threats to Openness, in OWNING ScIENrFIc
AND TECHNICAL INFORMATON, VALUE AND ETmCAL Issuus, supra note 17, at 198.
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property protection used in the field of biotechnology. Thus, these intellectual property
principles protect the exclusive rights of an inventor by interfering with the free access to the
developed idea or product, and the numbers and variety of protection forms show the theory
of intellectual property is deeply ingrained in the U.S. legal system.
C. Special Needs of the Biotechnology-Based Industries
Biotechnology-based industries rely on obtaining reasonably affordable financing for
research and development to remain innovative and competitive in the U.S. and the global
markets." The initial industry connection to the university communities has been
shown.91 However, because of the expenses and risks involved with research and product
development using biotechnology, the growth and development of companies involved with
biotechnology in the U.S. hinges on the availability of financing in the venture capital
market.' Thus, a prime concern of the biotechnology-based industries is what procedures
can encourage the availability of adequate capital. To analyze this concern, it is necessary
to understand the relationship between intellectual property rights, the economic necessity
of recouping research and development costs, and obtaining capital investment.
1. Patent Protection Is Criticalfor Recouping Research and Development Costs and
for Obtaining Capital
The speculative nature of most biotechnology research, due to the complex
technological and bureaucratic measures necessary to bring a product to market, presents a
high risk for investos. 9 3 Without any significant probability in recouping the research and
development costs, the possibility of developing a product and earning profits is
decreased.94 Considering the costs and risks of undertaking research involving
90. The competitiveness of U.S. biotechnology-based products depends upon broad issues such as fair
trade, intellectual property rights, and governmental regulation. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOoY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONoRESS, BIOTECHNOIOY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 45. Innovation, however, depends upon
encouraging research and development through biotechnology start-up companies, whose existence is dependant
upon investment financing. Id.
91. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (discussing the connection between modem
biotechnology industries and the university research system in the U.S.).
92. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOrECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY,
supra note 12, at 50. Venture capital is detimed as "funding for new companies or others embarking on new or
turnaround ventures that entails some investment risk but offers the potential for above average future profits
... often provided by firms that specialize in financing new ventures with capital supplied by investors
interested in speculative or high risk investments." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990).
93. Biotechnology has lost its earlier expectations of being able "to turn promises-for-tomorrow into
instant cash today" due to unforseen technological and regulatory hurdles. OFFICE 0'TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
U.S. CONGRESS, BIOm-NOLoGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 47. In fact, most U.S.
biotechnology-based companies have not made product sales and have been losing money. Id. at 48. See note
32 and accompanying text (describing typical costs incident to research in the modem pharmaceutical industry);
Janet H. Maclaughlin et al., The Economic Significance of Piracy, in INTELLECTuAL PROPERTY RIoHTs, GLOBAL
CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFICrT?, supra note 50, at 100-01 (discussing the high degree of risk involved with
investing in innovation fad high-technology in general).
94. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (describing the relation between patent protection and the
continued ability to develop and market a product).
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biotechnology, recovering these enormous costs has a direct relationship to the cost of
obtaining capital.95 Thus, the more exclusive and monopolistic the protection afforded to
the inventor of the resulting product, the better the possibilities of developing that product.96
Capital is the lifeblood of the biotechnology-based industries.' Again, because of the
speculative nature and the enormous costs involved in biotechnology research, substantial
expectations of profits is necessary to obtain any investment in a biotechnology entity.98
Biotechnology-based fir-ms have some guarantee of a profit if their inventions are protected
by intellectual property rights. However, without any significant probability of earning
profits sufficient to establish a reasonable rate of return, the availability of capital necessary
for the biotechnology entity to continue would be impaired." Thus, most investors would
not have the incentive to become involved.1°°
Requiring concessions for exploiting natural resources results in reduced protection for
intellectual property rights. By requiring compensation or limited forms of technology
transfer as payment for access to natural resources, the researching entity's expectation of
profits from its product would be lowered.'01 This would injure the researching entity
since capital will not be invested if the expected profit, if any, cannot guarantee repayment
the investment."°c Additionally, the removal of the intellectual property rights themselves,
through something functionally similar to requiring more extensive technology transfers,
patent waivers, or the forced licensing of a product, allows competitors to appropriate the
95. See Maclaughlin et al., supra note 93 (discussing that risks associated with innovative technology
cause underinvestment in those fields, and intellectual property rights provide stimulation for risky investments
without direct government action in the free market).
96. For instance, in promoting the development of new and better drugs, patent protection has itself
proven to be a vital factor, giving the manufacturer a limited yet assured opportunity to recoup the large
investment needed to bring a new drug to the point where it can be safely administered. Lemin, supra note 89,
at 194. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (describing the relation between patent protection and
providing opportunity to develop and market a product).
97. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
U.S. INvEs'ThfENT IN BIoTECHNoLoGY, supra note 3, at 175.
98. Alan H. Goldman, Ethical Issues in Proprietary Restrictions on Research Results, in OWNING
SCImNTIFC AND TECHICAL INFORMATION, VALUE AND ETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 17, at 74-75. Mossinghoff,
supra note 32, at 307.
99. Investing in technology and innovation is based upon expected future values of the developed product,
of which there is a high degree of variance. Maclaughlin et al., supra note 93, at 100-01. See supra note 90 and
accompanying text (discussing the role of intellectual property rights in encouraging innovation, thus encourages
investment).
100. 'Because patents are one of the most important assets of a start-up, high-technology company, failure
to procure timely patent protection can adversely affect a company's ability to secure the financing needed to
develop processes and products." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSEsSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN
A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 212. Failure to provide such intellectual property protection is to almost
guarantee that small start-up firms will be not survive regardless of their innovations. Kuflik, supra note 51, at
230-31.
101. Higher expenses, assuming the end product price is constant, translates into lesser profits. Finns
define profits as the excess of revenues over the costs. RICHARD G. LIPSEY Er AL., MICROECoNOMICs 181 (9th
ed. 1990).
102. "Although the free-market economy often is described as theprice system, the basic engine that drives
the economy is economic profits ... a fall in production costs creates profits for that commodity's producers.
Profits make an industry attractive to new investment."Id., at 421.
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inventor's research without the same research and development.' 3 By either option,
without the exclusive rights to the resulting product, obtaining investment and financing to
support research becomes more difficult, lessening incentives to enter into such activities.
Thus, one of the primary objectives of intellectual property rights is abandoned, and the
continued existence of biotechnology-based industries is threatened.
IMl. BACKGROUND OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED
WrrH BIODIVERSrrY
Presently, the world's ecosystems ' "4 are being plundered for their natural resources.
In the quest for such resources, habitat destruction on a massive scale has resulted in a world-
wide loss of species. °5 Without preservation of the numbers and variability of the planet's
species, humanity may lose all the potential benefits such species may have provided.I16
Humanity may also be endangering its own survival, since species can be thought of as
integral parts of an ecosystem."°e The U.S. objected to the provisions in the Convention
which implicated biotechnology in addressing and remedying these biological diversity
issues. °5 An understanding of these background issues is imperative in order to
comprehend the justification of the objectives of the Convention, and further to
comprehensively analyze the U.S. objections.
The standard practice of most biotechnology entities, commercial or otherwise, has been
to exploit the biological resources of a country without paying any compensation to the
103. In general, the basic technology to develop a product is inexpensive, due to factors such as the
massive amount of governmental support of basic research. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 54.
104. An ecosystem can be understood as a particular physical environment, the organisms that inhabit that
environment, and the interactions among those organisms. Convention, supra note 5, art. 2. Using such a
definition, an ecosystem can be considered the life-support system for all fife on the planet. Rackleff, supra note
6, at 405. For example, a tropical rain forest, a wetland, or a coastal reef.
105. "During the past 20 years, evidence has grown within the U.S. and worldwide that the diversity of
life at all levels is being eroded, and further, that this erosion has serious implications for natural systems upon
which humans rely." Cou.%iciL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 292. See also COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUamTY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL=TY: THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 292 (1980) (discussing the reasons why biological resources are threatened), cited
in COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 307. See generally Rackleff,
supra note 6, at 405,408-13 (discussing the general world-wide trends in the destruction of biological diversity).
106. Rackleff, supra note 6, at 405-06. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 284 (discussing that the growing
awareness of the econoric potentials of the rain forest has been prompted by a concern for such rapidly
diminishing ecologically diverse regions).
107. "It is becoming clear that sustainable human economic activity is dependant upon understanding,
protecting and maintaining the world's many interactive, diverse ecosystems with their complex networks of
species and their vast storehouses of genetic information." COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL REPORT,
supra note 42, at 292. For a detailed analysis of the dual concern for the planet's species themselves, and for
the effect of the loss of those species upon humanity, in the context of the drafting of the Convention, see
generally Rackleff, supra note 6.
108. See notes 22, 1.25 and accompanying text (discussing the realtionship between conserving biological
diversity, and the products or benefits from the exploitation of such resources).
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country in which the resources were originally found."° These resources are presently
considered by many U.S. policy makers to be in the public domain.11 As applied in the
field of exploration for biological resources the discovery of previously unknown or
uncelebrated plants or animals has proven to be profitable."'
A central theme of the Convention is recognizing sovereign rights over the natural
resources of a nation.' This concept of sovereign rights gives each participating nation
the authority to control its biological resources and therefore limit access to those resources.
The Convention's limitation of these rights provides the legal justification for the
Convention's mandates preserving biological diversity, and in particular the provisions in
dispute by the United States." 3 Exploiting an originating nation's biological resources
without any form of compensation undervalues such resources, and thereby discourages
efforts to conserve such resources as part of a sustainable use scheme." 4 Without the
recognition of sovereign rights, however, the goals of the Convention are moot, as otherwise
natural resources would continue to be open to access for all to enjoy and to exploit, without
any legal restrictions." 5
A. Definitions and Terms
The text of the Convention defines most terms of art relevant to a discussion of the
biotechnology-based industries." 6 Central to this discussion is the definition of biological
diversity. This term, often shortened to the word biodiversity, refers to "the variability
among living organisms from all sources," including the diversity within a species, between
109. Carlos M. Correa, Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights, 5 EUROPEAN INTEL. PROP.
REV. 154, 154 (1992). See Pharmaceutical Companies go "Chemical Prospecting" for New Medicines,
PHARMACEUICAL Bus. NEws, FiN. I'mms, Aug. 21, 1992 (availible in LEus, NEXIS library, PBNWS file)
(discussing briefly the past few decades of medicinal drug development and the resurgence of research on natural
biological products).
110. See Jane Perlez, Environmentalists Accuse U.S. of Trying to Weaken Global Treaty, N.Y. TIMEs, May
19, 1992, at C4. See also A Quid Pro Quo for Access, L.A. DAILY J., June 10, 1992 at 6 (quoting from the
OBSERVER, Bombay, India, stating that the U.S. wants free access to the valuable genetic resources of the
developing countries without paying any compensation).
111. For an interesting story concerning the accidental discovery of the wild ancestor of maize (corn), see
WrIT, supra note 12, at 14-16. The plant has already proven useful in the prevention of crop disease and other
commercial crop maladies, saving money globally and potentially worth billions of dollars. Id. at 16. See also
Pharmaceutical Companies go 'Chemical Prospecting'for New Medicines, supra note 109 (discussing the
modem role of exploration and research, and some of the notable historical discoveries from such activities,
including morphine and penicillin); Peterson, supra note 14, at 281-84 (discussing some of the resulting benefits
of natural product screening in the seed and medicinal plant industries).
112. This recognition is found throughout the Convention, e.g. pmbl., art. 3 (principle), & art. 15, para.
1. Convention, supra note 5.
113. See Rackleff, supra note 6, at 406 (discussing the concept of sovereign rights over natural resources,
and that limitations on those rights are necessary to preserve biological diversity).
114. Peterson, supra note 14, at 284.
115. This recognition of sovereign rights also presents a departure from previous world-wide practice in
the exploration and exploitation of biological resources. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11 (discussing
the historical and present practices of the biotechnology-based industries). See supra note 30 (discussing one.
primary motivation for developing countries to promote the Convention was the net effect of being able to
auction off their natural resources that were previously accessed without mandated compensation).
116. Convention, supra note 5.
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different species, and of all ecosystems in which the species exists.t"7 Another term,
biological (or genetic) resources, refers to natural resources including "genetic resources,
organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with
actual or potential use or value for humanity."1 '
The term biological technology, often shortened to the term biotechnology or biotech,
is defined as "any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms,
or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use."119
Biotechnology is vital to an everincreasing variety of industries, most notably the research-
based pharmaceutical, medical, and agricultural industries.'
The express goal of the Convention is the sustainable use of the world's biological
diversity. 2 1 Sustainable use in this context refers to "the use of components of biological
diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological
diversity ... ."122 The concept inherent in promoting of sustainable use of any natural
resource is to maintain the availability and usefulness of that resource in order to be able to
meet the needs of future generations.12 1 The framework of the entire Earth Summit was
built upon the concept that encouragement of efficient use of all resources is fundamental
to balancing growth and development with valid environmental concerns. 24
B. Provisions of the Convention Objected t6 by the United States
This Comment focuses on three of the provisions that the U.S. objected to when refusing
to sign the Conventi.n, specifically Articles 15,16, and 19. These provisions mandate that
the derived benefits of the originating nation's resources should be returned to that
originating nation as a form of compensation."ss This relationship between resources and
117. Id. arL 2.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Many high-technology research fields involve aspects of biotechnology to improve efficiency or to
invent new products. see generally, e.g., OFcE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 12; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOOY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, NEW DEvEmo-mENTS IN BIoTEcHNOLOaY: U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOOY, supra note 27.
WRIT, supra note 12; Peterson, supra note 14. See supra note 12 (discussing the practical definition of
biotechnology).
121. Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
122. Id. art. 2.
123. Id. See generally Rackleff, supra note 6 (discussing the goals of the drafter when constructing the
Convention and the importance of sustainable use).
124. Agenda 21, as the UNCED framework is titled, is designed to face the problem of implementing a
global plan for environmentally and economically sustainable development. Earth SummitApprovesAgenda 21,
Rio Declaration Record Number of World Leaders Attend, U.N. CHRONICLE, Sept. 1992, at 59. Weiss, supra
note 8. But see supra note 30 (discussing that a major motivation for the Convention itself, not necessarily the
entire UNCED, was to provide revenue for the developing countries).
125. The notion of compensation as a concession to the access and exploitation of an originating nations
natural resources was developed in the draft version of the Convention, mostly in the form of payments and loss
of intellectual property rights protection. See Rackleff, supra note 6, at 422 (discussing the draft Convention and
provisions mandating access to specimens of wild indigenous species). See supra note 22 and accompanying
text (quoting art. 15, 16, and 19 of the Convention and discussing the relationship between the benefits of
biotechnology research and the sought-after biological resources).
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compensation, as provided in the provisions of the Convention, is designed to encourage the
environmentally sound and sustained use of the biological resources of the planet.
The first of these provisions, Article 15, deals with access to genetic and biological
resources.'2 6 The provision has several important aspects. The provision recites the
recognition of each signatory nation's sovereign rights over its natural resources.' 7 The
provision states that each signatory nation shall allow access to biological resources and
should not take action inconsistent with the purposes of the Convention. 28 Access to
resources implicated by the Convention should be on mutually agreed terms.'2 9 Further,
each signatory nation that engages in scientific research based on biological resources shall
do so with the full participation of the originating nation. 30 Most importantly, the
provision requires each signatory nation to take measures "with the aim of sharing in a fair
and equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from" the
utilization of biological resources with the originating nation.'
The second provision disputed by the U.S. is Article 16,132 which asserts that
providing access to and transferring the derived benefits of biological resources, specifically
biotechnology, is essential for meeting the objectives of the Convention.'33 Each signatory
nation "undertakes ... to provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to .... " the other
signatory nations ".. .of technologies that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity or make use of genetic resources.""a The access to and transfer
of technology should be under fair terms, including concessional and preferential terms. 3 '
Where complying with the mandates of this provision might affect intellectual property
rights, the access to and transfer of such technologies shall recognize and provide "adequate
and effective protection" of such rights.'36 Most importantly, each signatory nation shall
take measures so that the developing countries providing biological resources are provided
access to and transfer of technology "... which makes use of those resources.., including
technology protected by patents and other intellectual property rights... in accordance with
international law...." 3 7 These measures also mandate similar access to resources and
corresponding transfers oftechnology for the benefit of both governmental and private sector
interests in the developing countries.'3 8 Article 16 concludes by stating intellectual
126. Convention, supra note 5, art. 15.
127. Id art. 15, para. 1. See supra notes 112-15 and the accompanying text (discussing the notion of
recognizing sovereign rights and the relationship to conservation of natural resources, a concept implicit in
sustainable use).
128. Convention, supra note 5, art. 15, para. 2.
129. Id. art. 15, para. 4.
130. IM. art. 15, para. 6.
131. Id. art. 15, para. 7.
132. IM. art. 16.
133. Id art. 16, para. 1.
134. Id.
135. Id art. 16, para. 2. "Concessional" in this context may be defined as yielding or conceding to the
granting of a preference, usually of specific privileges by a government. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 289 (6th
ed. 1990). "Preferential" in this context may be defined as the exercising of an action that chooses one target
as desirable over other possible choices. AMERIcAN HERrrAGE DICTIONARY 541 (2d college ed. 1989).
136. Convention, supra note 5, art. 16, para. 2.
137. -Id. art. 16, para. 3.
138. ILd. art. 16, para. 4.
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property rights may affect the Convention, and the signatory nations should cooperate to
establish international law which ensures the protection of intellectual property rights.'39
The third provision is concerned solely with Biotechnology itself. 4" Article 19
mandates that nations which provide the biological or genetic resources should be "provided
effective participation" in biotechnological research activities.' 4 ' Significantly, each
signatory nation shall take measures "to promote and advance priority access on a fair and
equitable basis ... to the results and benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon [the]
genetic resources" of the originating nation. 4 ' The remaining requirements in this
provision deal with the handling of biotechnology-based products and organisms"43 and
safety concerns about biotechnology modified living organisms.'
44
In these provisions, there is express recognition of the importance of intellectual
property rights. 45 However, these provisions also mandate that property protected by
intellectual property rights should be subject to the Convention provisions.146 Access to
and the transfer of technology protected by such intellectual property rights seems
inconsistent with the justification for having an intellectual property system. 47 The notion
of exclusivity, 48 inherent in an intellectual property system, necessitates monopolistic
control by the property owner over the access to and use of developed technology. As such,
139. Id. art. 16, para. 5.
140. Id. art. 19.
141. I1& art. 19, para. 1. See infra note 146 (discussing the vagueness of such terms and other possible
effects of the Convention language).
142. Convention, stpra note 5, art. 19, par. 2.
143. Id. art. 19, par. 3.
144. Id. art. 19, pars. 4.
145. See supra notes 136-37 and the accompanying text.
146. Id. Note that the terminology of these disputed provisions has been suggested to be somewhat vague,
as are other sections of the! Convention. This begs the question of whether there is room for other interpretations
of the disputed provisions. See generally Industry Calls Biodiversity Treaty Vague: Little Impact on
Competitiveness Expected, INT'L ENrvL. DAILY (BNA), Aug. 5, 1992 (availible in WESTLAW, BNA-IED
database) (discussing the reactions of some international business executives to the Convention). The relatively
vague references to taking appropriate "legislative, administrative or policy measures" to implement the mandate
of this Convention are seemingly vague. It may in fact be interpreted as mere policy changes. If so, any U.S.
objections based upon fears of forcing the Convention mandates on private industry is misplaced. See infra notes
202-03 (discussing the notion that the U.S. may have refused to sign the Convention not because of concerns
for intellectual property rights, but that issues of compensation should be handled by private contracting and not
by legislative or policy changes). Also vague is the theme of sharing in a "fair and equitable" way the results
of biotechnology. Although access to and transfer of technology seems to imply the concrete compensation
described in this comment, the practical results of such provisions may not so clear. Thus, competition in the
biotechnology field from leoth international and domestic entities could soon explode in the less developed world.
See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT, U.S. CONGREss, BIOTECHNOLOOY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra
note 12, at 39 (discussing concerns that biotechnology will be "rapidly adopted and commercialized" elsewhere
leading to loss of U.S. dominance). See also infra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing whether the
global leadership of the U.S. in biotechnology is under attack).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 44-52 (discussing the justifications for the intellectual property
system).
148. An exclusive right is defined as "one which only the grantee thereof can exercise, and from which
all others are prohibited or shut out." BLACK's, supra note 65, at 565. A patent, the most common form of an
intellectual property right, is a "grant from the governmental conveying and securing for an inventor the
exclusive right to make, =re, and sell an invention.. ."Id. at 1125 (defining the term Patent and construing 35
U.S.C. § 154) (emphasis added).
1992/ U.S. Biotech Intell. Prop. Rights: An Obstacle to UNCED?
these Convention provisions will result in a loss in some form for the U.S. biotechnology-
based industries.'49 This loss will be monetary, or some other concession, in compensation
for the biological resources exploited from the originating nation.'50 This may be a
smokescreen for U.S. fears of reduced short-term industry profits.
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES
OBJF ONS
The result of the Convention is to require that compensation be given to the originating
countries for the exploitation of their biological resources. The U.S. contends that this is an
intellectual property rights issue; thus, any loss resulting from a change in the normal
protections provided by those rights would be unacceptable and contrary to the whole
establishment of the intellectual property system. This mandated compensation might result
in the eventual loss of intellectual property rights,"' described as the "undermin[ing of]
the protection of ideas."'52 The U.S. viewpoint is explained by an analysis of the current
global state of intellectual property rights protection.
A. International Intellectual Property Rights Protection
The current state of international intellectual property rights protection for
biotechnology-based products is not globally uniform.'53 Differing standards as to the
subject matter allowed to be protected, the duration of the exclusive rights, and the
enforceable quantum of exclusive protection present uncertainty in the global marketplace.
Certain nations restrict the subject matter of inventions available for protection by
intellectual property rights. The duration of protection afforded by intellectual property
rights also varies depending upon the jurisdiction. A comparison between the levels of
protection offered by the U.S. and other countries helps in understanding the basis for the
U.S. refusal to sign the Convention.
149. Note that the Convention mandates distribution of not only the benefits derived from the exploitation
of an originating nations natural resources, but also the access to and transfer of technology relevant to the
preservation of sustained use. See note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements in art. 16 of the
Convention). This has also been used as a basis for objecting to the Convention, as being too broad, that it
.would cover technologies that are not even related to biodiversity, such as pharmaceuticals, animal and plant
varieties, and food products."Industry Trade Groups Laud President Bush for Decision Not to Sign Biodiversity
Treaty, supra note 8. But see generally Rackleff, supra note 6 (discussing the necessities for the objectives of
the Convention, including the transfer of any technology that would preserve biological diversity).
150. See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text (discussing the notion of compensation and its function
within the Convention). See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the notion that a primary goal of
the promoters of the Convention was to institute a mechanism for auctioning off biological or genetic resources
to obtain revenue for the originating nation).
151. See text accompanying notes 19-21 (introducing the U.S. objections to the Convention, expressing
the fear that resulting compensation schemes would ruin the incentive to innovate).
152. Earth SummitApprovesAgenda 21, Rio Declaration Record Number of Worl Leaders Attend, supra
note 124, at 63 (quoting then-President Bush).
153. "The public policies of many developing nations explicitly or implicitly permit the unauthorized use
of another's intellectual property. Local companies take advantage of that policy." Gadbaw & Richards, supra
note 50, at 2.
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1. The United States
United States intellectual property laws offer the largest protection of exclusive rights
for the largest array of subject matter. 154 The special needs of biotechnology have been
taken into account, for instance, allowing genetically-altered living organisms to be
patented.155 That decision was a basis for "the economic development of biotechnology
processes and products" in the U.S. during the last decade. 156 Other actions affecting
biotechnology-related intellectual property law in the U.S. include easing rules that
previously limited the commercialization of federally fundedresearch, and having a special
biotechnology unit established at the Patent and Trademark Office.!57 For greater
convenience and for supporting the interests of American inventors, the U.S. has entered into
most of the global and regional agreements for international patent cooperation. 5 ' When
balanced with the U.S. degree of protection, many nations, especially the developing nations
where the greatest amount of biological resources is commonly located, offer comparatively
sparse protection for intellectual property rights.
2. The International Experience
Recent evidence suggests a growing recognition of the value of intellectual property
rights in promoting development, investment, and modernization in the developing
nations.159 Notwithstanding this recent concern, many nations do not offer intellectual
property protection or they have taken action to remove such protection for certain types of
154. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CoNGREss, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 217. The U.S. protects all innovations that "can be embodied in a physical device
or process, irrespective or their technical subject matter .... Transcript of Presentation, [William J. Brunet]
Effect of Proposed Patent Harmonization Treaty on World Trade, in A.B.A. SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE, ANNuAt. SPRING MlEETNG 625 (1991). See also supra text accompanying notes 53-89
(describing in detail the forms and characteristics of intellectual property rights protection in the U.S.).
155. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (allowing the patenting of micro-organisms
altered using recombinant DNA technology). The current policy of the Patent and Trademark Office is to
consider nonnaturally occurring, nonhuman, multicellular organisms (including animals) to be patentable subject
matter." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY,
supra note 12, at 214.
156. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY,
supra note 12, at 209.
157. Id.
158. See generally k at 205-08; Westman, supra note 50, at 126-28.
159. Recent increases in the levels of intellectual property rights protection offered by some developing
countries have been suggested to be a result of recognizing the vital role such rights provide for stimulating
development. Peterson, supra note 14, at 280-81. Note that the effect of this Convention is to discourage such
recent trends. By insisting the mandates of the Convention apply regardless of the intellectual property rights
of the subjected technology, derived products, or resources, the countries lose motivation to strengthen their own
intellectual property laws. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (discussing arts. 15, 16, and 19, which
subject relevant technology or resources to Convention mandates even if protected by intellectual property
rights).
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property or inventions.160 The policy rationale behind limiting such protection is to
promote domestic industries and guarantee a low cost market for domestic consumption of
foreign goods. 6' By denying or limiting intellectual property protection for certain items,
products, or technologies, the foreign nations wish to allow their domestic industries greater
access to the foreign technology. "62 On the other hand, the failure to provide intellectual
property rights discourages the entry of the foreign competitor into the domestic market,163
as do schemes that force compensation from the foreign competitors to the domestic
industries, as in compulsory licensing.'" In addition, the domestic industries of the
limiting nation also lose the benefits, protections, and incentives that would be provided by
an intellectual property system.'"
Consistent with the U.S. statements regarding the Convention, a denial or significant
limitation on intellectual property rights has backfired when the denial of such rights is to
encourage and develop domestic industries. Patent protection should increase technology
transfer by encouraging the entry of foreign inventors and competitors into the domestic
market, which requires substantial physical as well as technological investment in that
nation.'66 This would still provide incentives to research and invent by affording
substantial expectations of profits through exclusive ownership for the holder of those rights.
160. For instance, India has removed pharmaceuticals from the definition of subject matter available for
a patent. Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 50, at 19. See generally Thomas Mesevage, Note, The Carrot and the
Stick: Protecting U.S. Intellectual Property In Developing Countries, 17 RuTrERs COMP. & TEcH. L. J. 421
(1991) (discussing trade and development related aspects of international intellectual property rights protection
or the lack thereof).
161. "The intellectual property policies of many developing nations reflect a development strategy on
making technology available within the domestic economy at the lowest possible short-term price." Gadbaw &
Richards, supra note 50, at 2.
162. Many developing countries evaluate intellectual property protection as an economic issue, balancing
piracy and disregard for intellectual property laws with the potential benefits for the domestic economy. Id. at
18. What intellectual property principles do exist focus on maximizing the influx of foreign technologies and
minimizing the resulting outflow of domestic economic and other resources. l at 19.
163. See notes 44-52 and accompanying text (discussing the role of intellectual property laws in providing
incentives to innovate and develop a product). But c.f. Mesevage, supra note 160, at 450 (discussing that if the
product is already developed, no more inducement is necessary; thus, the real issue is profitability).
164. In an effort to appease domestic concerns, many nations require forced licensing and similar programs
to ensure the product is available at a competitive price in the domestic market, theoretically at odds with the
free exercise of intellectual property rights. See Mossinghoff, supra note 32 (discussing the potential harsh results
of such schemes in the international pharmaceutical industry); Industry Trade Groups Laud President Bush for
Decision Not to Sign Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 8 (discussing that the language of the Convention, as
presented at Rio, allows compulsory licensing techniques detrimental and inconsistent with the policies behind
protection of intellectual property rights).
165. Thus, the necessity of an intellectual property system is "recognized" in most countries, although not
always with the same objectives as in the developed world. See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 50, at 18-19
(addressing the various objectives in different countries). See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing
a recent trend in the strengthening of intellectual property laws in some developing countries).
166. The long-term benefits to the domestic economy coincident to protecting intellectual property rights
result from increased rates of technology transfer, infrastructure development for innovative activities, and the
creation of incentives for increased foreign investment in the domestic economy. Maclaughlin et al., supra note
93, at 91. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing the recent trend in certain developing countries
toward strengthening intellectual property laws to encourage development). See also Maclaughlin et al., supra
note 93, at 98-102 (1988) (discussing the role of a domestic patent system in the developing nations for
encouraging technology transfers from the developed world).
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Thus, the policy of denying protection or imposing limitations upon the intellectual property
rights may in fact be frustrating the underlying goals of an intellectual property system. 6
3. Intellectual Property Rights Harmonization
The United States objections to the Convention are strengthened by noticing the actions
of several international trade organizations and treaty commissions currently involved with
intellectual property rights issues. 68 Both the World Intellectual Property
Organization 69 and the current round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
170
negotiations encourage establishing international uniform intellectual property protection
schemes. 17 ' This is a process called harmonization, originally developed in the Paris
Convention, 172 which is designed to result in a uniform standard of intellectual property
rights world-wide. 17' The current Uruguay round of the GATT talks is embroiled in
controversy between the developed and the less developed nations, of which the arguments
about the protection of intellectual property rights is dominant. Many of the developed
countries, notably the U.S., want the issue of international protection of intellectual property
rights addressed in the GATT.
74 The less developed countries disagree.
175
The Convention seems to be in conflict with this theory of harmonization. 7 6 It
suggests that even though there is a recognition of intellectual property rights, the overall
167. But see Mesevage, supra note 160, at 422 (discussing the concerns that intellectual property rights
might themselves be illogical if imposed merely for the purpose of increasing the development of the lesser
developed countries).
168. For an introductory analysis of the international trade negotiations involving intellectual property
rights in the biotechnology-based industries, see generally I.L. "Pep Fuller, Intellectual Property Rights
Associated with Biotechnology - An International Trade Perspective, 16 AIPLA Q. J. 529 (1989).
169. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967,21 U.S.T.
1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (establishing the WIPO) [hereinafter WIPO].
170. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATI].
171. Correa, supra note 109, at 154.
172. Brunet, supra note 154, at 628. The International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
(Paris Union Convention), Mar 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, T.S. No. 37, as revised. This agreement, administered
by WIPO, resulted in granting reciprocal recognition of filing dates for patent applications among the signatory
nations and the right to retain an original filing date for subsequent patent applications in other such nations.
OFFICE OF TECHNoLoGY ASSEsSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note
12, at 206.
173. Intellectual property rights should be granted world-wide in an effort to establish a level playing field
over the entire globe. Fuller, supra note 168, at 531.
174. Id. at 533; Peterson, supra note 14, at 277-78. See generally Mark L. Damschroder, Note, Intellectual
Property Rights and the GAT: United States Goals in the Uruguay Round, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367
(1988) (discussing the GATT intellectual property dispute, with emphasis on the development of the U.S. goals
in prioritizing the protection of these rights in the current round of negotiations).
175. Principally, these would be the newly industrialized countries, such as Brazil and India, with their
insistence that intellectual property rights undermine the development of their own domestic high-technology
industries. Fuller, supra note 168, at 532. See supra notes 159-67 (discussing the problems of the international
protection of intellectual property rights). Note that for the developing countries, usually those with the least
protective intellectual property laws, would have to change the most under harmonization. Gollen, infra note 204,
at 634.
176. See Industry Trade Groups Laud President Bush for Decision Not to Sign Biodiversity Treaty, supra
note 8 (discussing the U.S. justifications for objecting to the Convention in light of the GAIT negotiations).
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amount of protection will be lowered. Under the Convention, products, benefits, and
technologies derived from the originating nation's biological or genetic resources should
flow back, in part, to the originating nation. 7 Although deemed compensation, the
Convention diverges from the harmonization movement by still mandating access to and
transfer of derived biotechnology ostensiblyprotected by intellectual property rights. Thus,
the Convention fails to engage mechanisms for strengthening the originating nation's
intellectual property system.
1 8
B. Motivations for Signing the Convention
The use of biotechnology has increased productivity, and has resulted in the
development of many new products and research methods. 179 The mandates described in
the Convention, deemed an integral step in achieving growth and eliminating suffering in the
less developed world without a loss in biological diversity, 8 ' provide incentives for
nations holding tremendous amounts of biological resources to provide access to those
resources.'81 The result should be increased opportunities to find new resources and derive
new and better products. 8
The Convention, and its underlying objectives, should be in the best interest of all
nations, even though for many industries short-term profit margins may suffer. Concerns
for the environment, poverty, and the survival of all species are the expressed goals of the
Convention, and the signatory nations must have agreed that the mandates therein present
a proper solution. However noble those concerns, the nations have signed because it is in
177. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (quoting the provisions themeselves and introducing the
relationship established by the Convention mandates to share and recieve the benefits of exploited resources, and
the resulting impacts upon intellectual property rights ). See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text
(discussing the mandates in the disputed Articles of the Convention and their connection to exploiting natural
resources).
178. "[Trhe treaty as offered in Rio presents a serious risk of interfering with intellectual property
principles that the United States is pushing in the GATT negotiations. While GAIT efforts are aimed at
strengthening intellectual property protection worldwide ... the biodiversity treaty language allows countries
that are the source of raw materials for biotechnology to pass laws that cut back on the intellectual property
rights of companies that develop products from such materials." Industry Trade Groups Laud President Bush
for Decision Not to Sign Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 8 (paraphrasing Jeff Kushan, Office of Legislation and
International Affairs, United States Patent and Trademark Office, discussing the Convention as offered in Rio
de Janeiro) (emphasis added).
179. See notes 31, 111 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of biotechnology and some of
the resulting innovations and products).
180. This goal of sustainable development is the underlying objective of the Convention. See Weiss, supra
note 8. Note this concept is presented in the preamble, which states the objectives and principles of the
Convention. "Aware that conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity is of critical importance for
meeting the food, health and other needs of the growing world population, for which purpose access to and
sharing of both genetic resources and technologies are essentiaL" Convention, supra note 5, at 823 (emphasis
added).
181. Rackleffsupra note 6, at422 (discussing the draft version of the Convention and efforts to encourage
the availability of biological or genetic resources for research and conservation purposes by requiring
compensation for the resource holder).
182. See generally id. (discussing the draft Convention, and presenting an anlysis of the benefits, economic
or otherwise, that the human race recieves from preserving the biological diversity of the planet).
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their best long-term economic interests to encourage biotechnology.' 83 Any loss from
concessional demands, whether monetary or in an actual decrease in the protection of
intellectual properly rights by way of technology transfer, will be a sacrifice for the better
opportunity to find new viable products while contemporaneously stabilizing the dwindling
supply of biological resources.'"a
V. THE EF rS ON THE BIOTECH-BASED INDUSTRIES
A. Effects of the Convention
The Convention is an international effort to create treaty-based obligations in a
framework for preserving biological diversity, and as such, deals with biological diversity
in a "comprehensive, global manner."185 The main strength of the U.S. contention is that
intellectual property rights are necessary and indispensable to the biotechnology-based
industries. However, because of the existenceof the Convention, contrary industrial activity
and experience, and because a majority of the nations world-wide are signatories of the
Convention, biotechnology-based industries in the U.S. will be subject to the provisions of
the Convention regardless of whether the U.S. itself becomes a signatory.
1. Compensation or Other Concessions
The net effect of the Convention will be the loss, to some extent, of the exclusive
protection provided by intellectual property rights. The U.S. fears, and therefore wishes to
avoid, a situation where a holder of some form of U.S. intellectual property right will have
to begin compensating developing countries for what was previously exploitable.
Notwithstanding that concern, a central concept implicit in the Convention is "to ensure that
those who benefit from the use of [biological resources] pay some of the costs of ensuring
that those species remain viable in the wild, where they can continue to evolve."' 86
The Convention mandates the "fair and equitable" sharing of the "benefits" of research
and exploitation of biological or genetic resources between the exploiting entity and the
183. But see supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing that a prime motivation for the Convention
was the ability to generate revenue from the auctioning of a nations biological resources).
184. This seems to be part of the implicit theoretical basis for the disputed provisions of the treaty of the
Convention - that the sustainable use of the planet's biological resources is necessary for both development and
environmental concerns. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (describing sustainable use). See generally
Rackleff, supra note 6 (presenting the reasons why preservation of biological diversity is important, in the
context of international environmental law and the relations between the developed and the lesser developed
nations).
185. See Convention, supra note 5, pmbl. (discussing the importance of global cooperation among the
contracting parties, intergovernmental organizations, and the private sector); Rackleff, supra note 6, at 414-15
(discussing the draft version of the Convention in terms of its goals, objectives, and requirements for signatory
nations).
186. This passage is quoted from a discussion of property rights in biological resources, specifically
preserving biological diversity in the context of plant varieties. JEFFREY A. McNEELY Er AL., CONSERVINO THE
WORLD'S BIoLoGicAL DIvERsrrY, IUCN, WRI, CI, WWF-US, THE WORLD BANK 118 (1990). See supra notes
121-24 and accompanying text (discussing that the Convention's goal of sustainable use is necessarily a product
of compensating originating nations for the exploitation of their natural resources).
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originating nation."' 7 Also mandated, is access to and transfer of technology derived from
biotechnology. 8 Consistent with the objectives of the Convention, these forms of
compensation will provide the developing countries with the biotechnology and
biotechnology-based products and processes that are necessary to provide for the sustained
use of that nation's biological resources. 9 By imposing such limitations on intellectual
property rights, the U.S. believes this will decrease incentives to further indulge in research
and development. 9 ' The Convention may also act as a disincentive to enter into the
economies of the developing countries.1 9'
2. Signing the Convention May Not Greatly Injure United States Biotechnology-Based
Industries
The U.S. biotechnology-based industries generate billions of dollars per year in total
commerce." 2 Markets for biotechnology-based products are continually expanding. The
U.S. industry dominance, which can be traced back to the connection between the U.S.
research universities, the government, and private industry, is not being challenged.'93
With research and development well supported and the continual furtherance of the state-of-
the-art, biotechnology has a bright future.' 94
187. Convention, supra note 5, art. 19, para. 2. See supra notes 125-50 and accompanying text (discussing
the disputed provisions of the Convention).
188. See supra notes 125-50 and accompanying text (discussing the disputed provisions of the Convention,
Articles 15, 16, and 19).
189. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the compensation relationship established by
the Convention between the exploited resources and the distribution of derived benefits, products, or technologies
useful in the sustained use of biological diversity). See also supra note 30 (discussing that one primary
motivation for the Convention was to increase the amount of economic benefit developing countries recieve from
their natural resources).
190. To force these concessions, whether monetary compensation schemes or the transfer of technology
through the loss of some actual intellectual property rights protection, is inconsistent with the intellectual
property rights system of U.S. industries. See supra notes 44-52 (discussing the role of intellectual property
system in encouraging innovation).
191. Industry Trade Groups Laud President Bushfor Decision Not to Sign Biodiversity Treaty, supra note
8 (citing Richard Wilder, member of the patent law committee of the Association of Biotechnology Companies,
discussing the possible impacts of the Convention's treatment of intellectual property rights).
192. For instance, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry generated an estimated revenue of $1.5 billion and $2.0
billion for the years of 1989 and 1990. respectively OFFICE OF TEcHNOLOGY AssEssMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 7. However, most biotechnology-based firms have
yet to achieve profitability and rely on continual investment to survive. See supra notes 93-103 (discussing the
critical importance of capital to biotechnology-firms in the U.S.).
193. There is no definite evidence to show that U.S. biotechnology-based industries are being threatened
by foreign competition. OFFICE OF TEcHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 67. But see Industry Trade Groups Laud President Bush for Decision Not to Sign
Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 8 (discussing possible risks to U.S. comepetitiveness including the National
Research Council's assertion that the U.S. is in danger of losing its competitive edge in biotechnology to
Japan); THE PRESmENT's COUNCIL ON COMPETrIVENESS, REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTiCHNOLOGY POLICY,
supra note 40, at 4-5 (discussing increasing global competition in the biotechnology markets as possibly
challenging U.S. dominance).
194. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY,
supra note 12, at 168.
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Even assuming such compensation or loss in intellectual property rights, the Convention
encourages more access to the biological resources.19 5 By providing some form of
compensation to the originating nation, it may become easier, more practical, and much more
fruitful to research and exploit the tremendous amount and diversity of the biological
resources of the developed nations.' 96 Thus, this Convention may provide more
opportunities forprofit making in many fields, which in the long-term can only benefit U.S.
biotechnology-based industries-those in the best position to take advantage of such
conditions. A loss as a result of imposed compensation schemes, or even the loss of
intellectual property rights by the transferring of some protected technologies, consistent
with international law,197 may not significantly hamper the biotechriology-based
industries.'
9 s
B. Market Forces Subjecting the Biotechnology-Based Industries to the Convention
Regardless of Official United States Stance
Even without the U.S. signing the Convention, industries involved with biotechnology
in the U.S. will likely be subject to the provisions of the Convention.'" Pursuant to the
Convention provisions, nations with biological resources suitable for exploitation should be
receiving compensation for the exploitation of those resources."ro
In internationa l trade, as well as in poker, whoever lays the best hands on the table wins.
The goal of biotechnology-based industries is gaining access to the most biological
resources, and thereby the greatest opportunity to develop marketable and profitable
products. Those nations that will abide by the Convention mandates and allow access to
their biotechnology, who will transfer their technological innovations, who will share
equitably the benefits resulting from the use of biotechnology and the exploitation of
195. See supra notes 179-84 and the accompanying text (discussing the anticipated result of the
Convention in the context of why the other United Nations members signed the Convention).
196. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits preservation of biological
resources will provide to those interested in exploiting such resources, specifically the biotechnology-based
industries).
197. Note the express recognition of the protections of international law within the access and transfer
provisions of the Convention. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing Article 16).
198. See infra notes 204-17 and accompanying text (discussing the specific actions taken by U.S.
biotechnology-based industry members, apparently consistent with the underlying goals of the Convention). Note
the expectations for the growth of biotechnology and the biotechnology-based industries, which may counteract
this effect, if any. Supra notes 193-94.
199. See U.N. Bic-diversity Treaty Seen Likely to Affect U.S. Biotech Firms, INT'L ENVTL DAILY, Sept.
25, 1992 (availible in WasTLAw, BNA-IED database) (discussing that the failure of the U.S. to sign the
Convention will not be important and that if U.S. companies wish to do business in a signatory nation, they will
be subject to the Convention mandates of paying compensation); U.S. Rio Stance Said to Hurt Competitiveness,
supra note 21, at 5. (di;cussing that companies in the signatory nations might have business advantages over
U.S. companies due to the disputed Convention provisions). But see Industry Calls Biodiversity Treaty Vague:
Little Impact on Competitiveness Expected, supra note 146 (discussing the results of an informal survey of
business executives in France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, concluding that the Convention may not have much
impact on the normal business transactions in international biotechnology-based industries).
200. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of compensation as used in
the Convention).
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biological resources, and who will allow full cooperation of the originating nation in the
research efforts will be the clear winners in the biotechnology-based industries.
20 1
It is a matter of simple economics that those who hold the resources will seek the best
possible price, and the Convention provides the mechanism for putting such supply and
demand forces into affect. These market forces will compel biotechnology firms in the U.S.
to follow the mandates of the Convention in order to stay competitive with other
biotechnology-based firms who have bargained for access to resources with representatives
in the less developed countries. Thus, since the Convention has provisions clearly mandating
compensation for exploiting biological resources, the U.S. refusal to sign may suggest a
preference to leave such compensation issues to private contracting," 2 therefore leaving
intact enforceable intellectual property rights.2 3
1. Specific United States Corporate Action
Specific actions taken by U.S. biotechnology firms lend support to the conclusion that
the U.S. biotechnology-based industries will be subject to the mandates of the
Convention."' In September 1991, the international pharmaceutical company Merck &
Co. entered into a contract with Costa Rica's National Institute of Biodiversity. °5 This
agreement allows, Merck, to search for, collect, and eventually screen natural and biological
samples of prorising plants, animals, and insects for two years from a preserved section of
201. See U.S. Rio Stance Said to Hurt Competitiveness, supra note 21, at 5. (discussing that companies
in the signatory nations might have business advantages over U.S. companies due to the disputed Convention
provisions).
202. "The Bush Administration has consistently said it could not agree on behalf of private companies for
the transfer of their technology on a concessionary basis to poor countries whose genetic materials the companies
use." Jane Perlez, 98 Nations Adopt Biological Treaty; U.S. May Not Sign, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1992, It
(discussing third world involvement in the Convention negotiations and meetings in Rio de Janeiro). See Marlise
Simons, Ecological Plea from Executives, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1992, § D at 1. (discussing a meeting of business
executive coincident to the Earth Summit which generated a report stating transfer of technologies to the
developing nations is best dealt with on a private contracting basis).
203. Directly contrary to this point of view, the Convention's language suggests a theory that the
signatory nations should not rely on the free market to deal with technology transfer issues, but instead pass
legislation or other policy changes to govern these transactions, even at the cost of intellectual property rights.
See supra notes 125-50 (discussing the disputed provisions of the Convention).
204. See generally William K. Stevens, Shamans and Scientists Seek Cures in Plants, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
28, 1992, at C1 (discussing the recent resurgence of medical and chemical research into natural products, and
the inclusion of the biological resource originating nation in the process); Back to Nature for Chemicals and
Drugs, INDUSTRIAL BIOPROCESSING, Oct., 1991 at 3 (discussing that the Technology Management Group of New
Haven, Cr, stated in a 1990 report that, worldwide, over 46 companies and 82 research organizations were
studying natural resources for medicinal purposes). See also generally Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual
Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 4 HARv. J. op L. & TECH.. 193, 216-17 (1991) (discussing the
use of intellectual property laws to provide a means to solve international biodiversity problems).
205. Stevens, Shamans and Scientists Seek Cures in Plants, supra note 204; Peterson, supra note 14, at
287-89. The National Institute of Biodiversity is a private, nonprofit, scientific organization establish in Costa
Rica for the scientific preservation of that nation's tropical forests. William K. Stevens, Costa Rica in Pact to
Search for Forest Drugs, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 24, 1991, at C4.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 6
the Costa Rican tropical rain forest, in exchange for monetary compensation of $1 million
cash and royalties upon resulting product sales.2 6 This is not a singular occurrence.
Many companies, from the U.S. and elsewhere, are returning to the traditional
techniques of natural product screening. 20 7 These types of voluntary agreements are
designed to provide access to potentially profitable biological resources, °8 while at the
same time providing incentives and mechanisms for the originating nations to support
conservation of dwindling biological resources.2 Thus, parties seem to win in this type
of situation; one party preserves its environment, the other obtains a valuable product or
commodity to market. These agreements are a major step toward meeting the long term
goals of biological diversity and natural habitat preservation.210
It is clear that this type of private agreement is one many parties would agree upon. For
the U.S., this situation clearly preserves the intellectual property rights of biotechnology-
based firms; what i; given away as compensation, whether monetary, royalties upon patents,
or transfer of resulting benefits or technologies, is only what is negotiated in contracting with
the resource holders. These private agreements are potentially consistent with U.S. concerns
over forcing mandatory compensation or technology transfer schemes on private firms. 1
Mutually bargained-for exchanges voluntarily relinquishing some amount of compensation
does not implicate reductions in the extent of protection afforded by intellectual property
rights systems.
212
The National Cancer Institute (NCI), discoverer of the famous cancer drug Taxol which
is derived from the bark of the Pacific Yew tree, is also interested in this type of private
agreement; so interested that they have awarded millions of dollars in contracts to nonprofit
scientific organizations for research across the globe.213 In these contracts, although any
resulting patent would remain with NCI, the contracting representative of the host country
would be listed as a codiscoverer, would receive samples for preservation and research
206. Stevens, Shamans and Scientists Seek Cures in Plants, supra note 204; Pharmaceutical Companies
go "Chemical Prospecting"for New Medicines, supra note 109.
207. As opposed to initially developing new products, drugs, or medicines from scratch or by invention
in a laboratory, natural product screening involves first finding compounds and lifeforms from the natural
environment. See Stevens, Shamans and Scientists Seek Cures in Plants, supra note 204 (discussing this
screening of natural and biological resources for purposes of developing new products, in the context of plant
species of the tropical rain forests); Pharmaceutical Companies go 'Chemical Prospecting'for New Medicines,
supra note 109 (discussing this type of situation within the medicinal drug industries); Prospecting for Drugs,
TECH. REV., Oct. 16, 1992 (discussing the resurgence of such trends in the medical drug research process);
Peterson, supra note 14, at 287-90 (discussing the growing numbers and varieties of such activities between
high-technology companies and nominal rain forest biological resource holders).
208. It is estimated that one quarter of today's medicinal drugs contain compounds developed from plant
species, resulting in plant species having a value of $63 billion in the global pharmaceutical marketplace.
Prospecting for Drugs, supra note 207, at 17.
209. Gollen, supra note 204, at 216.
210. I
211. See supra notes 202-03 (discussing that the U.S. refusal to sign may be an indication of a preference
to leave such matter to private contracting).
212. Obvious negative impacts of these private agreements are the increased costs for developing
biotechnology-based products, the decreased recouping of research and development costs, as well as the possible
discouragement of start-up biotechnology firms. Some of these concerns might result in higher costs for the
consumer.
213. Prospecting for Drugs, supra note 207, at 16.
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activities, be offered training for the host nation's technical personnel, and most importantly,
a percentage of any resulting product sales.2"4 Other international companies involved
with biotechnology, as well as governmental and national scientific organizations,2 15 and
smaller biotechnology-based companies,216 are studying the possibilities of becoming
involved, or have become involved, in situations similar to the Merck agreement.21 7
Since many such industry members are presently undertakiig actions consistent with
the underlying goals, if not the mandates, of Articles 15,16, and 19, it seems that the present
form of the Convention would not actually injure U.S. biotechnology-based industries. U.S.
biotechnology-based industries have flourished despite having taken actions consistent with
the Convention, suggesting there is no reason for the U.S. to be as paternalistically concerned
as is reflected by its official stance towards the Convention.
VI. CONCLUSION
The objective of the Convention is to preserve the biological diversity of the planet.
Concern for the intellectual property rights system caused the U.S. to be the only major
industrialized nation to refuse to become a signatory to the UNCED Convention on
Biological Diversity at the Conference. Fearing that the impact of the Convention upon the
biotechnology-based industries will impair competitiveness, the U.S. has declared that the
Convention will destroy the whole justification for having an intellectual property system.
Intellectual property rights are the foundation of modern industrial research and
development. As this Comment illustrates, the existence of intellectual property rights is
deemed essential to the U.S. biotechnology-based industries. In the field of biotechnology,
biological and genetic diversity is absolutely essential for the preservation of adequate
rdsearch material. Without the conservation of biological resources, the result of preserving
the biological diversity of our planet, biotechnology will become worthless.
The extent of protection provided by intellectual property rights may be decreased as
limitations on the exclusivity of protected property are enacted by the Convention. The net
effect of this Convention may be nothing for the U.S. to fear. Even assuming a short-term
economic detriment upon biotechnology-based industries, the Convention may actually
further the development of biotechnology through expansion of access to biological
resources and increased opportunities for research and development of those resources.
Additionally, such fear is rebutted by the specific actions of many U.S. biotechnology-
based firms. Specific private action consisting of bargained-for compensation currently
exists and reaches similar ends without the compulsory compensation scheme mandated in
the Convention. This private bargaining preserves, rather than compromises, the intellectual
property rights system. Thus, biotechnology-based firms will be complying with the policies
of the Convention regardless of the U.S. official decision not to become a signatory.
If the failure to engage in this type of global cooperation will result in the depletion of
the planet's biological diversity, then what shall happen to biotechnology? Similar to a
214. Id.
215. Pharmaceutical Companies go "Chemical Prospecting" for New Medicines, supra note 109;
Prospecting for Drugs, supra note 207, at 17.
216. Pharmaceutical Companies go "Chemical Prospecting" for New Medicines, supra note 109.
217. Id. For instance, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Glax, and SmithKline Beecham. Id
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computer scientist afraid that paying money to help continue the flow of electricity will cut
down on his profit margins, rejecting this treaty because it significantly affects the source
costs and incentives to enter the field is economically shortsighted. "We ignore these losses
at our peril ... [t]hey're like the proverbial miners' canaries, silent alarms whose message
in this case is that living species of animals and plants are now vanishing around the world
one thousand times faster than at any time in the past 65 million years.... 2 " The world
must act to fend off such disaster, but we must also recognize the potential fiscal and
ecological benefits from the sustainable use of the natural environment. Regardless of the
prospect of ecological catastrophe, the market forces established by the existence of the
Convention will compel the U.S. compliance to the policies, if not the letter, of the
Convention on Biological Diversity.
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